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ALUMNI NOTES.
W. H. Taylor, '01, was admitted to the
Supreme Court on January 6th. He subsequently spent a few days in Carlisle and
has since located at Grand Encampment,
Wyoming. THE FORUM wishes him
abundant success.
A. Frank John, '00, spent several days
in town during the month. He has for
some time been located in Mt. Carmel,
and reports a fair share of business.
At a special meeting of the council of
the thriving borough of Renova, Pa.,
held Wednesday evening, February 12th,
W. E. Shaffer, 100, was unanimously
elected borough solicitor.
In the Birkbeck will case, which came
up in the Orphan's court of Luzerne county recently, Daniel Kline, '01, was one of
the attorneys representing the niece, who
was ignored in the first will, but whose interest in the estate under the last will
would be in the neighborhood of $40,000.

We are pleased to note that Mr. Kline has
been retained on a number of important
cases since his admission to the bar seven
months ago.
SCHOOL NOTES.
Rothermel, of the Junior class, has gone
to his home for the pre .ent, owing to
continued poor health. We trust he may
soon be enabled to return.
Benjamin, '04, has been appointed by
Judge Simonton as one of the viewers for
a bridge to be erected at Lackawanna,
near Scranton.
ALLISON SOCIETY.
°The adjournment of the congress conducted by the Allison Society terminated
the longest continuous programme that
was ever conducted by that society.

The

congress began in the latter part of January and remained in continuous session
until March 7th. During that time twelve
sessions were conducted, and six bills and
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about fifteen resolutions were passed.
Among the bills that were passed were
the following: Bill to increase the Army
and Navy; bill to purchase the Panama
Canal; bill to construct a cable between
San Francisco and Manilla; bill to exclude
the Chinese. Several other bills were
considered but were defeated on final
reading.
The adjournment of the congress brought
to a close one of the most instructive programmes that the Allison Society conducted during the present term. It not
only imparted to the members a knowledge of how the national congress is conducted, but it gave them an excellent drill
in parliamentary training, and opportunities to debate subjects of national importance, subjects in which every citizen of
the United States is interested. That these
benefits were appreciated was demonstrated by the hesitancy of the members to
adjourn the congress. At the last session
the advisability of continuing it for another mouth was discussed, but, at request
of the executive committee, who have
other plans under consideration, the resolution to adjourn the congress was adopted.
One of the instructive debates was that
on the Chinese Exclusion act. Crary,
Adamson, Willis, Carlin, Flynn, Yocum
and Spencer talked in favor of the bill;
Donahoe, Benjamin, Core and White
talked in opposition to it. The affirmative
won by a small majority. The arguments
of the negative were exceptionally strong.
They presented this interesting question
in a different light than that in which we
usually view it, appealing more to reason than passion. The arguments were
logical and appealed strongly to the conservative minds. They received the arguments from Mr. Wu, the Chinese minister
in the United States, with whom they
had correspondence.
The future sessions of the Allison will
not be routine. The executive committee
is preparing several programmes that will
be as inueresting as the congress.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The newly elected officers were installed
at. the meeting of March 7th. Presidentelect Hickernell assumed the position of
president with the good will of the society

to support him. His inauguration speech
was brief, pointed and apropos. He outlined an administration which, if carried
out, bodes well for the future of Dickinson
Society. The program rendered at this
meeting, was, as usual, interesting and
well rendered. The regular debate was
dispensed with, on motion, as some of the
debaters were not present. This is a circumstance which is unfortunate, to say
the least. Members should be sufficiently
interested in the work to respond willingly at the meetings, take their proper
part of the program and bear some of the
burden of the work. It is an evil in literary societies, that the work is apt to devolve upon a few. It is to be hoped that
members hereafter will at least notify the
executive committee that 'they cannot
serve. Time is too precious, and opportunity too meagre to let both slip by without an effort to grasp them and make the
most of them.
The meeting of March 14th was opened
by President Hickernell in the chair. The
society attendance was not beyond the
usual standard. The program was partly
carried over from the last meeting.
It seems to be a perplexing question
with our executive committee as to whom
to procure for a lecturer. It is so long since
we had a lecturer come before our society,
that everyone is expressing the desire
that arrangements be made to procure
a response to our invitation. We would
remind the executive committee that Dr.
Reed has promised to lecture to us again.
The annual inter-society debate between
Dickinson and Allison has not yet been
suggested in our meeting. It is our turn
to challenge Allison Is it possible that
it will fail to cometopass? We hopenot.
The large number of exchanges of the
Forum in the library should suggest to the
executive committee thatsomething of in:
terest might be culled from them to spice
our programs. Many of the articles found
in them would be interesting and instructive, if they were read as part of the program.
The Juniors are taking a remarkable interest in society work, and it is with
pleasure that we notice it.
A question which seems to bequite puzzling is "Where is the minute book?"
Committeemen Schanz and Morehouse
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failed to find any trace of it, and so reported at the last meeting. Finder, please
return.
DELTA CHL
James B. O'Malley, Esq., of Cornell
University, and A. Frank Johns, Esq., of
Mt. Carmel, Pa., were banqueted in the
Chapter rooms here on their return from
the University of West Virginia, at
Morgantown, where they installed a new
chapter of the Delta Chi. Addresses were
delivered by the guests of honor, and also
by Prof. F. C. Woodward, Guy Thorne,
R. J. Boryer and William Osborne. Both
Mr. O'Malley and Mr.-Johns are officers
of the Grand Chapter, and they both are
pleased with the prospect for an influential
and prosperous Chapter in West Virginia.
Mr. Thorne was Dickinson's representative at the installation. It was during
the career of Messrs Boryer and Osborne,
of Dickinson, in the West Virginia University, that the organization of the new
Chapter was begun, and it will always be
regarded as an offspring of Dickinson.
Both the grand officers congratulated
Dickinson upon its flourishing condition
and upon the work it has been doing.
They reported that all the Chapters of the
Fraternity are enjoying unusual prosperity.
BOOK REVIEWS.
PENNSYLVANIA LAW OF CONVEYANCBy Christopher Fallon,of the Philadelphia Bar. T. & J. W. Johnson &
Co., 1902, pp. xix, 909.
Mr. Fallon's work, based upon notes
taken for the author's own -use, and dealing with the special features of the Pennsylvania law of conveyancing, must prove
a practical aid to the practitioner in this
state.
The author's aim as stated in the preface
is, " to bring together all the acts of the
assembly and decisions of the court, relating to the transfer of real estate, and
arrange them in such a shape that the
busy practitioner might readily find the
law on any given point," and the puipose
has been successfully accomplished, both
as to matter and arrangement, by a lucid
and concise statement of the law, careful
discrimination in the selection of illustra-
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tive cases, and the application of astute
analytical powers to a logical disposition
of material, making possible a highly satisfactory and workable index.
The book contains over nine hundred
pages, including the excellent index, a
table of cases cited, and a chronological
collection of the acts of the assembly
quoted with reference to pages.
The work proper is divided into twentyfive chapters, each with a carefully prepared synopsis of paragraphs, and without extended intrusion of personal theories,
covers very completely the ground set out
in the title.
The profession will find this exposition
of the fruits of Mr. Fallon's experience,
not only an excellent literary production,
but a valuable every-day reference book.
THE LAW OF WITNESSES IN PENNSYLVANIA.
The Pittsburg Legal Journal, of March
12th, in reviewing this recent work says,
"Professor Trickett has written a great
many text books on Pennsylvania Law
and they have been uniformly of a high
standard. The present work is one of the
best. As the title indicates, it is nota work
on the general Law of Evidence, but only
on the parts of the subject relating specially
to the witness, and is almost entirely
confined to the Competency of Witnesses,
and Opinion or Expert Testimony." After
quoting from the preface, the writer continues "Thework contains about 700 pages,
including a good index. The subject-matter is well arranged so that the exact point.
wanted may be readily found. The citations of cases are complete and the important ones are given very fully so that a
reference to the report is usually unnecessary. It covers largely a new subject in
Pennsylvania law, and will be found to be
of great assistance in the trial of nearly
every case and in the settlement of claims
in the Orphans' Court."
The following is a continuation of the
Mfoot Court cases assigned:
Plaintiff

No. 91.

No. 92.

Defendant

Longbottom,
Claycomb,
Watson.
Miller,
Sherbine, J.
Hamblen,
Mowry,
Walsh.
Gross,
Hickernell, J.
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No. 93.

No. 94.

No. 95.

No. 96.

No. 97.

No. 98.

No. 99.

No. 100.

No. 101.

No. 102.

No. 103.

No. 104.

No. 105.
No. 106.

Lanard,

Lourimer,

Shomo,

Wilcox.

Schanz, J.
Morehouse,
Shiffer,
Brock,
Adamson.
Davis, J.
Conry,
McIntyre,
Turner,
Boryer.
Brooks, J.
Spencer,
Wilier,
Willis,
Knappenberger.
Brennan, J.
Kaufman,
Fox,
Drumheller,
Vastine.
Ebbert, J.
Minnich,
Sterrett,
Osborne,
Rhodes, F.
Points, J.
Thorne,
Brooks,
Williamson,
Hindman.
Laubenstein, J.
Bouton,
Keelor,
Schanz,
Wright.
Walsh, J.
Wilson,
Wingert,
Oldt,
Rothermel.
Vastine, J.
Elhneg,
Lonergan,
McKeehan,
Points.
Aclamson, S.
Albertson,
Bradshaw,
Chapman,
Jacobs, J. H.
Wright, 5.
Flynn,
Matthews,
Hugus,
White.
Yeagley, J.
Fleitz,
James,
Hillyer,
Rhodes, J.
Moon,
Houser,
MacConnell.
Brock, J.

No. 107. Brennan,
Delaney,
Miller,
Myers.
Hindman, J.
No. 108. Hubler,
Lloyd,
Benjamin,
Carlin.
Kline, 3.
No. 109. Mowry,
Jones,
Peightel,
Cooper.
Bishop, J.
No. 110. Phillips,
Drumheller,
Sherbine,
Cisney.
Schnee, J.
No. 111. Claycomb,
Mays,
Longbottom,
Peightel, J.

No. 112. Berkhouse,
Houck,
Lanard,
Shiffer.
Drumheller, J
No. 113. Crary,
Mowry,
Cannon,
Schnee.
MacConnell, J.
No. 114. Davis,
Tuiner,
Laubenstein,
Boryer.
Osborne, J.
No. 115. Dever,
Kline,
Core,
Ebbert.
Bouton, J.
No. 116. Kaufman,
Yeagley,
Walsh,
'Watson.
Myers, J.

MOOT COURT.
THOMAS vs. HARVEY.
Receipt by check--Recital "payment in
full"-Prima facie and not conclusive
evidence of settlement-Duty to investigate records-Fraud.
SCHNEE and WILLIAMSON for the plaintiff.
A receipt, "in full," is not conclusive,
but only prima facieevidence of payment.
Batdorf v. Albert, 59 Pa. 59; Flynn v.
Hurlock, 194 Pa. 462.
Dixon had sufficient notice of the prior
mortgage to cause him to investigate and
he is bound by whatever his investigations
would have disclosed. Murphy v. Nathan,
46 Pa. 508; Uhler v. Hutchinson. 23 Pa.
110.
STAUFFER and WANNER for the defendant.
A receipt in full is conclusive when
given with a knowledge of all the circumstances. Tucker v. Murray, 10 Lane. 235;
Fowler v. Smith, 153 Pa. 639; Smith v.
Cohn,170 Pa. 132.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Sloan Thomas loaned Harry Harvey
$2,000.00, receivingas security a first mortgage on the realty of Harvey. One year
after loan of $2,000.00, Harvey desiring to
secure an additional $1,000.00, applied to
Dixon, who agreed to loan him $3,000.00
on condition of his paying Thomas
$2,000.00 in satisfactioh of his mortgage
and giving Dixon a first mortgage for the
$3,000.00. At Harvey'ssuggestion, Dixon
gave him a check for $1,$00.00, payable to
Thomas, in full payment of his mortgage.
Harvey told Dixon that he had $500.00 in
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cash, intimating that he would use that
in conjunction with the $l,500.00 to satisfy Thomas' claim.
Harvey gave the check for $1,500.00 to
Thomas who, apparently unmindful of
the stipulation that it was in full payment
of mortgage, had check cashed ; it was returned to Dixon, who, upon its receipt,
paid to Harvey the remaining $1,500.00.
Harvey never paid Thomas the balance
of $500.00 due on mortgage, hence Thomas
never satisfied the mortgage.
Thomas' mortgage still of record, Dixon's mortgage became a second lien on
the land and his claim was inferior to that
of Thomas. The Jemaining $500.00 being
unpaid, Thomas in order to secure it sued
out a writ of scirefacias,and caused land
ta be sold. At the sale Dixon, in order to
secure his interest, bid $3,000.00; land sold
on his bid.
In the distribution Dixon claimed the
whole of the $3,000.00, since it represented
the amount of his claim against the land.
The question to be decided is whether
Thomas, having accepted a check for
$1,500.00, purporting to be in full payment
of mortgage, is entitled to $500.00 of the
proceeds of the sale, "balance due on his
mortgage of $2,000.00 ;" or whether Dixon
is entitled to the whole of the $3,000.00.
It seems clear from the facts in the case,
that it was the intention of Harvey to defraud Thomas. He represented to Dixon
that he would pay Thomas, by the check
for $1,500.00 and $500.00 in cash, the full
amount of the mortgage. There is absolutely no evidence of an agreement between Thomas and Harvey whereby
Thomas waived a part of the $2,000.00 due
him on his mortgage.
A receipt in full is primafacieevidence
of a settlement, but not conclusive. It
may be attacked on the ground of fraud,
mistake or ignorance of his legal rights in
the party who gave it, is the principle laid
down in Hamsher v. Kline, 57 Pa. 397.
It is held in Hartman v. Danner, 74 Pa.
36, that payment of part of a debt, though
received in satisfaction, if without a release under seal, will not have the effect of
extinguishing the whole. This principle
is also laid down in the following cases:
Lowrie v. Verner, 3 Watts319; Megargel's
Adm. v. Megargel, 105 Pa. 475.
In Clark on Contracts, page 189, we find
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that the simple payment of asmaller sum,
in satisfaction of a larger, is not agood discharge of a debt, for it is doing no more
than the debtor is already bound to do,
and is therefore no consideration for the
creditors promise to forego the residue.
The only exceptions are gifts and releases
under seal, these are based on the fact that
in addition to the part payment there is
some new benefit or consideration, even
though slight, to sustain the creditor's
promise to forego the residue of the debt.
Where the creditor agrees with the
debtor to accept a lesser amount in satisfaction of his claim, the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction applies. But as a general
rule the doctrine of accord and satisfaction rests upon a mutual agreement between the parties.
There must be an aggregatiomentium.
Parsons on Contracts, 6th ed. 685.
Where a note or a check of a third person constituted the consideration, it was
held in Lauer v. Getzer, 3 Sup. 461,
"Where the creditor accepts the note of a
third person in payment of his debt, a novation takes place. Mere acceptance of
the note does not constitute a novation
without evidence that it was taken in satisfaction of the debt, In all cases the burden of proof is upon the party asserting
the novation.
The facts within my possession fail to
show any evidence of an agreement between Thomas and Dixon whereby a novation was created, since the burden of
proof to show such novation was on the
defence. In my opinion the defence failed
to establish the novation.
In most cases cited by the defence, it
was manifest that there was an accord and
satisfaction. In the absence of such
agreement in this case, I am unable to see
the relevancy of the cases cited.
It was held in Economy Coal Company
v. Bracewell, 78 Ill. App, 235. "One who
accepts a payment tendered to him in full
satisfaction of his claim, is estopped from
claiming thereafter a balance on such
claim." But it rests on the party setting
up estoppel to show grounds upon which
it rests. Wood v. Bullard, 151 Mass. 331.
One of the grounds to be shown, would be
knowledge of the creditor to be estopped.
From the facts as presented in this case, I
am convinced there was no agreement be-
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tween Thomas and Harvey whereby
Thomas should accept $1,500.00 in full satisfaction of his mortgage for $2,000 00.
This is made clear by Harvey's representation to Dixon as to $500.00 cash that he
intended to apply to Dixon's check for
$1.500.00. Thomas' attitudein the matter
clearly proves that his acceptance of the
check was due to an oversight on his part,
in failing to notice that it was stipulated
that the amount was in full payment.
Thomas being the first mortgagee, his
mortgage remaining unsatisfied, the balance due on it was still a first lien on the
land, notwithstanding the representations
and promises made by Harvey.
Granting that Mr. Thomas was negligent in accepting a check marked in full
payment of his mortgage, when it lacked
$500.00 of being tie amount of the mortgage. Mr. Dixon was negligent in a
greater degree, since he reposed the utmost
confidence in the statements of Mr. Harvey, and relying solely upon them, he
advanced $3,000.00 on security which he
now comes before the court and asks to be
construed in his favor, to the detriment
of one entitled to the protection of the
court.
The court records are open to our investigation. When one buys realty it
devolves upon him to secure himself as to
the validity of the title he is about to
acquire; likewise, when one wishes to
place money out on interest, he must
ascertain the worth of the security he is
about to receive. If he neglects to make the
necessary examination and relies upon the
representations of others, he does so at his
own peril, and on an occasion such as is
presented in the case we are now considering, it is unreasonable to ask the court to
protect one against loss occasioned by his
own negligence.
It is a principle deeply rooted, "when
one of two innocent parties must suffer
for the wrongful act of a third party
he must suffer who put it in the
power of such third party to do the
wrong." In this case it isaquestion as to
who should suffer for the wrong of Harvey, since Dixon put it in the power of
Harvey to do the wrong he should suffer
the loss rather than Thomas.
Mr. Dixon was grossly careless in not
insisting upon an actual satisfaction of

Thomas' mortgage on record, or a power
of attorney to satisfy the mortgage. Since
he was content with the returned check,
and Mr. Harvey's representations. I am
satisfied that Mr. Dixon should suffer the
loss occasioned by the fraud of Mr. Harvey.
Judgment is therefore entered in favor
of the plaintiff for the sum of Z.500.00, and
against the defendant.
HINDMIAN, J.

ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. vs. THORPE.
Electric Light Co.-Placing of poles-Injunction-Burden of proof as to servitude.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The Borough of Ephrata was already
supplied with light by an electric light
company under a contract to light the
streets for four years. Meantime, the
plaintiff company was incorporated and
obtaining the consent of the council, proceeded to plant its poles and stretch its
wires. Its charterauthorizedit to furnish
light to the borough and its inhabitants.
In front of Thorpe's house were already
two poles of the former company, and one
of a trolley company. The plaintiff is undertaking to plant another pole in front of
his house, and he has removed it three
times. Hereupon an injunction is asked
by the company against the further interference with the pole.
He answers, (1) That the borough being
already supplied with light, the plaintiff's
planting of the pole is taking an easement
for a non-public use; (2) The planting of
an additional pole before his house is oppressive and discriminates against him because it. could be as conveniently, for the
company, planted elsewhere. The plaintiff demurs to the answer.
CHAPArAN and CORE for plaintiff.
The borough has the right to granteasementson its streets. Trickett on Borough
Law, .395; Lockart v. Craig St. R. R., 139
Pa. 419. The injunction may be granted.
Haverford Light Co. v. Hart, 13 Pa. C. C.
369.
CARLIN and KEELOR for defendant.
An injunction is not allowable to restrain one from interfering with anything
that is going to damage his property.
Beiver v. Hurst, 162 Pa. 1; Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 ; Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa.
274.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

The one question of importance is involved in the first point presented by defendant. A case almost analogous is foundin York Telephone Co. v. Keesey, 5 District Reports. An ordinance of the city
required telephone companies to obtain a
license before planting poles, to give dimensions of each and also intended location. The company failed to do so and
planted one in front of property of defendant, which he cut down. Subsequently
the company complied with the ordinance.
In the hearing for an injunction it was
held that under the circumstances, defendant was justified in cutting them
down, but if plaintiff complied with city
ordinance, an injunction restraining defendant from interfering would be granted,
the learned court saying:- "Poles and
wires of a telephone company impose no
additional servitude upon a street. Rights
of owners of abutting properties on a
public street are subject to paramount
rights of the public which are not limited
to a mere right of way but extend to all
beneficial, legitimate street uses of which
this is one. A telephone company is a
quasi-public corporation and must serve
every one who applies, on equal terms.
It is not a corporation for private business,
and there is, therefore, no constitutional
objection to its enjoying rights of eminent
domain."
A borough may permit erecting of poles
and wires along and across streets without
compensation to property owners and
exact from such company a license fee for
such privilege. Trickett Borough Law
See. 395, also Lockhart v. Street Railway
Co. 139 Pa. 419.
In case of Haverford v. Electric Co. 13
C. C. 369. The poles of plaintiff company
were placed in front of defendant's property but within limits of the highway and
a few feet from defendant's fence line.
Defendant cut down the poles; company
replaced them and secured a preliminary
injunction to restrain him from further
interference with the poles. The court
saying "An electric light company may
plant their poles on the side of a country
road, abutting land owners are entilled to
such damages as they may sustain by
location of poles and wires."
In answer to the second point presented

by defendant, it does not work any more
hardship upon him than upon any other
property owner and does not appreciably
diminish the value of his property nor
does it discriminate against him. If he
can show additional servitude imposed upon him, he has his action at law. A permanent injunction restraining defendant
from interfering in any manner with
poles and wires of plaintiff company is
therefore granted.
LONGBOTTOM , J'.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The light company has the authority
of the state to erect poles on the streets of
Ephrata, upon obtaining the consent of
the borough council, and it has obtained
that consent.
The borough could have suspended its
consent on compliance by the company
with conditions as to height, thickness,
color of the poles, their closeness to each
other, the number that might be planted
before any man's premises, etc., but it does
not seem to have done so.
It seems, if we are to accept Russ v.
Pennsylvania Telephone Co. 3 D. R. 654,
that in addition to the conditions specified by the municipal council, the court
has a limited power to impose conditions.
McPherson, J., therr enjoined the company against planting a pole "in front of
any of the doors or windows of the plaintiff's building" then in course of erection,
after ascertaining, at a hearing, that the
pole might be placed equally advantageously for the company, "a few feet
north or south of the point first chosen,
without interfering with the plaintiff's
windows or doors."
It is conceivable, with the increase of the
number of corporations supplying light,
locomotion, or intelligence, by means of
electricity within a borough, that a large
inumber of poles should be placed on the
land of one citizen, who might thus receive an undue share of the burdens. If
he can be subjected to four, he may also be
to forty. It seems reasonable that aftor a
certain charge has been placed on one man,
no more should be imposed unless it appears that the selection of another site for
the poles is not reasonably convenient.
Thorpe, having already three poles, thinks
that the fourth should be placed on some
other lot. If it could with substantially
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as much ease and convenience be placed
elsewhere, we agree with him that he
should not be compelled to suffer the additional burden.
But on whom is the burden of proof?
On Thorpe to show the practicability of
another location, or on the company to
show its impracticability. As the company can readily show if it be a fact that
no other site will be as convenient and useful as Thorpe's premises, we think it
should be expected to do so. It asks the
court to enjoin Thorpe from protecting his
premises from what, primafacie,is an undue multiplication of servitudes, to the relief of his neighbors. Let the company,
then, show that this multiplication is unavoidable, if the objects of the company
are to be efficiently accomplished. Until
it does so, it should not be aided by a chancellor in imposing the fourth pole on
Thorpe's premises. Nothing in York Telephone Co. v. Keesey, 5 Dist. Rep. 366, is
inconsistent with this conclusion.
Decree reversed with procedendo.

The second wife claimed $300.00 and onethird of the personalty, while the child by
the second marriage claimed two-thirds of
the personalty. The auditor awarded the
money to the second wife and child.
LANARD and MYERS for appellant.

A decree in divorce, granted by a court
of a foreign state, in which libellant only
lived a statutory period for the purpose of
procuring a divorce, will not be recognized
as valid by the courts of this state. Com.
v. Ainsworth, 6 Dist. Rep. 707.
Where the court has nojurisdiction over
the wife, and from said court the husband
obtained a divorce, the wife will have
dower. Calvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375 ; Reel
v. EIder, 62 Pa. 308.
LLOYD and Fox for appellee.
Appearance by attorney for respondent
at any stage of the proceedings gives jurisdiction of the person. 43 Hun. 461; 17
Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1063.
Jurisdiction of defendant's person having been obtained by her counsel, having
entered an appearance, it cannot be lost
by the withdrawal of the counsel after
issue joined. Wilson v. Hilliard, 17 W.
N. C. 325.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

That the injured party in the marriage
relation must seek redress in the forum of
Divorce-Jurisdictionof courts of another the defendant unless the defendant has restate-Appearance of defendant by at- moved from what was the common domitorney- Validity of the divorce.
cile of both is well established as the law
of Pennsylvania; Reed v. Elder, 62 Pa.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
308.
In Fyock's Estate, 135 Pa. 524, the court,
Smith married Sarah Jones, August 3,
Patterson, Judge, held, "If a court has not
1898, a year afterwards desiring to obtain
jurisdiction, neither notice nor process
a divorce from her, he secretly went to
duly served can give validity to its judgSouth Dakota whose laws allow divorce
ments." The same rule is applied in Reel
to all libellants who have resided in the
v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308; Colvin v. Reed, 55
State 90 days, for incompatibility of temper
Pa. 375 ; Heslop v. Heslop, 82 Pa. 540, and
and other causes. He intended to return
Commonwealth v. Maize, 23 W. N. C.,
to Pennsylvania as soon as he had obtained the divorce. Notice was given of 572. In the latter case it was further
held, "If the defendant had cause 6f
the proceedings to Mrs. Smith by letter,
action against his wife, he could have
by a deputy sheriff, of South Dakota,
proceeded in the courts of his and her
who personally served the notice on her
domicile. If he had cause of complaint it
in Reading, Pa., and by publication in a
was his duty to bring that complaint beSouth Dakota and Berks county newspafore the court having jurisdiction of the
per. She directed an attorney of South
person and the cause. To avoid this court
Dakota to appear and object to the court's
and seek a court in a foreign state isprima
jurisdiction. The attorney did so, but
the court decreed a divorce nevertheless, facie evidence of a fraudulent motive on
the part of him who acts thus.
for incompatibility of temper.
From the fact that the court had no
Smith then returned to Pennsylvania
and married again. At his death 4 years jurisdiction, it follows that the decree of
divorce pronounced by the court of South
after, Sarah claimed as widow, $300.00 as
Dakota, was a mere nullity, at least so far
exemption, and one-half of the personalty.
PAUL SMITH'S ESTATE.
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as its extra territorial effect was con cerned,
and did not alter the status of the parties
in Pennsylvania, unless Sarah Smith
(nee Jones) by her instructions to the
South Dakota attorney, and the said attorney's subsequent actions in pursuance
of such authority, had the effect of waiving the want of jurisdiction. Was anythingdone by Sarah Smith or her attorney, which produced such a result? It
appears that Mrs. Smith directed an attorney of South Dakota, to appear and object to the court's jurisdiction, and that
the attorney did so. Nothing in the facts
before us indicate that the attorney did
anything or took any step in the cause,
except to object to the want of jurisdiction. He was simply instructed to appear
for a special purpose, viz., to object to the
court's jurisdiction.
Under the circumstances it would be
difficult to see how therespondent waived
the want of jurisdiction over her person
by expressly objecting to it. Can It be
successfully asserted that: by expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of a court, a
person thereby waives the want of jurisdiction? We think not. In 1 Am. &
Eng. Ency. of Law, page 184, the rule as
to an appearance for any particular purpose is thus stated: "An appearance for
any particular purpose such as to take advantage of defects, is not a waiver of those
defects." By weight of authority it seems
to be established that an appearance for
moving to quash a writ for want of jurisdiction or insufficiency of service, does
not subject to the jurisdiction or waivethe
illegality; Hodges v. Brett, 4 Green (Ia.)
34.5; Wilburn v. Foutz, Id. 346; Johnson
v. Buetts, 26 Ill. 66; Camp v. Tibbetts, 2
E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 20. The precise point
in the case before us was ruled on in Stanley v. Arnow, 13,Fla. 361, where it was
held that. "an appearance merely to object, is not a waiver of want of jurisdiction." In Warren Saving Bank v. Silverstein, 15 C. .585, it is said. "In otherjurisdictions, where appearance de bene esse are
unknown, motions to set aside the service
of the writ, or to quash it, are allowed, but
must be made before appearance, and
making such a motion is not an appearance. In foreign attachment the court
has no jurisdiction of the person of the defeudant, except by his own voluntary ap-
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pearance. Demanding the release of his
property as unlawfully seized, especially
when he expressly declares that he does
not intend to submit to the jurisdiction, is
not equivalent of a voluntary appearance."
In Chalwon et. al. v. Hollenbach, 16 S.
& R. 424, it is held that a motion by an attorney to set aside a judgment by default
against a party, is not an appearance for
him.
In view of these facts we are of the
opinion that the appearance of the attorney in the South Dakota court, to object
to the court's jurisdiction wasnota waiver •
of her right, and the court never had any
jurisdiction over her person. It would
follow, therefore, that the decree of divorce
-pronounced by the court in South Dakota
was void in Pennsylvania, that is, it was
a mere nullity in Pennsylvania as if it had
never been pronounced. This being so,
Smith's subsequent marriage in Pennsylvania was void for the reason that his first
wife being still in full life. he did not have
capacity to contract a second marriage.
The second marriage therefore was illegal
and the said child, an illegitimate child.
Act April 8, 1833.
The only question yet remaining is, can
the first wife successfully claim the $300
widow's exemption and one-half of the
personalty, she having lived apart from
her husband for more than four years?
The Act of April 14, 1851, See. 5, P. L.
613, provides as follows: "The widow or
the children of any decedent dying withi n
this commonwealth may retain either real
or personal property belonging to said estate to the value of $300, and the sante
shall not be sold, but suffered to remain
for the use of the widow and family."
Under this act it has been held that a wife
who did not form a partof his family and
homestead, could not successfully claim
the $300 exemption; Platt's Appeal 80 Pa.
504; Spear's Appeal, 26 Pa 234, and Hetrick v. Hetrick, 55 Pa. 292.
In all these cases, however, the family relation was broken up either by the default
of the wife, or with her consent. In Ferry's
Appeal, 55 Pa. 347, the distinction is clearly
drawn between the case of a wife who voluntarily relinquished the family relation
and one who is living separate and apart
from her husband through the default of
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the husband. In this case, Terry had deserted his wife and was absent from her
ten years before his death, he living in
Lanaster county, and she in Philadelphia with her mother and keeping the
two children, the issue of their marriage.
Upon being apprised of his death some
eight months thereafter, the wife by counsel appeared before the auditor and claimed
the $300 provided under the Act of 1851.
The auditor allowed the claim, the Orphan's Court set it aside, and upon an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Orphan's
Court was reversed. Mr. Justice Agnew,
in his opinion, saying, "In this case there
was no voluntary relinquishment of the
relation (family relation) on the part of
Mrs. Terry, and no provision for her;
while after her husband's desertion she
kept the children and maintained her
family relation along with them so far as
lay in her power."
There is no reason why this provision of
the law should not apply to her. In such
a case the family relation exists in the contemplation of the law, although actual cohabitation be suspended by the illegal act
of the husband. This doctrine is also
found in Coatis' Estate, 6 W. N. C. 367;
Sander's Estate, 12 Pa. 77, and in Scullins' Estate, 5 C. C. 188. We see nothing in the case before us to distinguish it
from the cases just cited, and therefore the
auditor is hereby reversed and the court
directs that Sarah Smith, the lawful wife
of Paul Smith, be paid the $100 as exemption, and one-half of the personalty
absolutely.
YEAGLY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The divorce of Smith, by the South
Dakota court, was valid, it may be, in
South Dakota. The law of that state
makes a service on a non-resident who is
not within the state at the time of service
effectual to subject him to its jurisdiction.
In South Dakota, therefore, Sarah Jones
would not be at Smith's death, his widow.
The Constitution of the United States
requires full faith and credit to be given,
in any state, to the judicial proceedings
of any other state, and generally, that -in
the former, the same legal consequence
shall attach as in the latter.
As the
divorce separates Smith and wife in South

Dakota, so it would seem to separate them
in Pennsylvania.
The principle of interstate comity is
bounded by the condition, (1) that the
court which pronounces judgment must
have jurisdiction of the person, and (2)
that it cannot acquire a jurisdiction of the
person, which the tribunals of other states
must recognize, by service of process.
beyond the state limits. Cooley Const.
Law, 205. It. would matter not whether
this extra-territorial service was accomplished by publication, or, as in this case,
by a personal service by a deputy sheriff
of South Dakota. The service on Mrs.
Smith was sufficient to give her notice
of the assumption by the South Dakota
court of jurisdiction in a case affecting her,
but could not oblige her to respect it, to
the extent of making a defence on pain of
suffering a judgment which would be
valid, not in South Dakota merely, but
in Pennsylvania. The cases cited by
the learned court below sufficiently prove
this. Scott v. Noble, 72 Pi. 115; Colvin v.
Reed, 55 Pa. 375.
Mrs. Smith, however, did respect the
service of process so far that she employed
an attorney to appear for her and to object
to the court's jurisdiction. Such an appearance, called in this state de bene esse,
is well known. It is not generally understood to be the equivalent of a general appearance, nor does itjustify the arrogation
by the court of power to prosecute the investigation to a judgment on the merits
2 Epeyc. Plead and Pr. 620. Although it
would lead to confusion to allow a defendant to appear for such purposes as he
chose, only, there is no apparent reason for
denying to him the rights to appear solely
to deny jurisdiction over his person, without, by so doing, conferring thevery jurisdiction which he denies. The learned
court below correctly inferred that the
qualified appearance of Mrs. Smith ny attorney, did not bestow on the South
Dakota court the jurisdiction to decree a
divorce between her and her husband.
On the other points involved in the
case, discussion is unnecessaiy. Mrs.
Smith has done nothing to forfeit the
right to the widow's exemption. As there
are no legitimate children she is entitled
to one-half of the personalty.
The
woman whom, after his divorce, Smith
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married, though his wife in South Dakota,
is not his wife in Pennsylvania. Nor is
her son entitled to a share in Smith's
estate.
Appeal dismissed.
TRITT vs. RAILWAY COMPANY.
Negligence-taster and servant-Independent contractor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tritt in crossing the track in a wagon
was struck by a locomotive and hurt.
The Railroad Company sent its physician
to treat him. Tritt submitted to the
treatment which was unskillful, and resuited in a permanent injury to his leg,
whereas with proper treatment, Tritt
would in two.months have gotten well.
In his action for the negligence of the
company he sought damages for the primary injury, and also for the increased
injury, following from the unskillful treatment.
Tritts' own physician agreed with the
mode of treatment proposed by the defendant's physician at the interview immediately after the accident and then retired
from the case.
GERBER and MOREHOUSE for the plaintiff.
The master is liable for the torts of his
servant, committed while acting in the
course of his employment. Bardv. John,
26 Pa. 486; Guinney v. Hand, 153 Pa. 404;
Hays v. Miller, 77 Pa. 238.
BOUTON and PRICKET for the defendant.
The physician was an independent
worker, and not a servant of the company.
Tiffany, Domestic Relations, p. 508; Qf.
86 Pa. 153; 3 Gray (Mfass.) 349; 120 N. Y.
315.
OPINION OF THIE COURT
The material question upon which this
case hinges, is whether or not the defendant company is liable for the acts and
negligence of the doctor.
The plaintiff was injured while crossing railroad tracks of defendant company,
and the company sent. its own doctor to
attend him. The doctor was an employee
of the company, hud the relation of
master and servant existed. The plaintiff's
first remedy was an action against the
company, because the master is liable and
bound by acts of his servant, either in
respect to contract or injuries, when the

act is done by his authority. Here the
act was done by authority of the master.
This injury was done in the immediate
employment of the master, and resulted
from the negligence of the doctor, while
acting within the scope of his employment. In this case the master as well as
-the servant is responsible, this act was
done by order of the master, and done in
the prosecution of master business. It
does not have to be done in accordance
with the instruction of the master to
servant. Even though the servant deviates
from the instruction as to manner of doing
it; this does not relieve the master from
liability for the servant's acts. In this
case, the defendant tried to show that the
doctor was an independant contractor.
The statements of facts make it plain
enough that no such relation existed because there is a wide difference between a
servant and an independent contractor.
If a person contracted with another, who
is engaged in an independent employment
for the doing of certain work by the latter
but does not personally interfere or give
direction, respecting the manner of the
work, then the party employed is an independent contractor, but in this case the
doctor was employed to do the company's
workin his line, and under the company's
order. He was in their employment at
the time of the accident, and was sent to
attend the plaintiff at the time of his
injury, by order of the company. Here
he was in company employment, sent by
the company, and the employment was of
such a character as to create the relation
of master and servant between them.
CANNON, J.
OPIN fON OF THE SUPREME COURT.
There is substantially no dispute that
Tritt was hurt by the negligence of the defendant, and its liability for the result of
that injury is notseriously disputed. From
the injury thus received, he would have
got well in two months, had it been
treated with proper skill. It was not
treated with such skill. The prolongation
and aggravation of the injury are the result. Is the defendant liable for such aggravat ion ?
Had Tritt himself called on the physician, whose want of skill is alleged, the
defendant would not for that reason be
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exempt from lidnility for the effects of
such want of skill co-operating with the
original injury. It would in addition be

necessary to show that Tritt employed a
physician whom, with proper care, he
would have known to be destitute of the
usual competence. Lyois v. Erie Railway Co., 57 N. Y. 489 ; Eastman v. Sanborn, 85 Mass. 594; Rice v. City of Des
Moines, 40 Iowa, 638; Loeser v. Humphrey.
41 Ohio, 378; Stoever v. Bluehill, 51 Me.
439; 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 391 ; 16 Am. &
E ng. Encyc. (1st edition) 441. It does not
appear that the reputation of the physician
who attended Tritt with respect to skill or
carefulness was bad, nor that he had any
reason to believe him to be otherwise than
competent.
But the physician who attended Tritt
was furnished by the defendant himself.
It would be idle therefore to say that, even
had Tritt had reason to know him incompetent, he would have precluded himself
from recovery from the defendant. The defendant, surely, could not defend against
the claim for compensation, on tieground
that the physician whom it furnished,
acted unskillfully or negligently.
Had the defendant not been the cause
of the original hurt, we are quite prepared
to hold that it would not have been liable
for the mistake of the physician, if it had
exercised proper care in the selection of
him. It must be deemed, at most, an
agent of the plaintiff, in naking the selection. It is not the business of the railroad
company, to heal wounds, but to transport
passengers and goods. Though, should it
occasion an injury, it would be obliged,
either to furnish the physician himself, or
to furnish the money which the plaintiff
would need to spend in hiring one, and although, having caused the injury, it furnishes the physician, the physician is an
independentworker. He receives no orders
from the company. He consults his own
knowledge, or that of others whom lie
chooses to select. The company having
exercised care in designating him for the
task, is not responsible for his errors of
judgment, or imperfectness of knowledge.
or defects of attention. Pearl v. West End
Street Railway, 176 Mass. 177; Glavin v.
Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. 1. 411 ; Cf.
Edmundson v. IR. R. Co., 111 Pa. 316;
Harrison v. Collins, 86 Pa. 153 ; Smith v.
Simmons, 103 Pa. 32.

The learned court below took a different
view of the question, apparently without
much investigation or reflection holding
that the physician was servant to the
Company, and that for this reason, his
want of care and skill was imputable to it.
This we think an error. However, as it
allowed the jury to give compensation for
the entire injury, a proper verdict, upon
the evidence, seems to have been reached.
Judgment affirmed.
BALPH vs. R. R. CO.
Evidence-?es .qestac-AdmissibilitV of
declarations of a bg.stander a3 part of
-Spontaneous utterances and expres-

sions of inference distinguished-?epetition of inadmissiblestatements
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Balph was run into at a crossing and
hurt by the defendant. At the trial
Althorp testified for him that no bell had
rung or whistle blown, and that the train
was coming at forty miles per hour. Five
minutes after the accident he had remarked to John Logan, that Balph would
not have been struck had he taken the
trouble to look and listen before venturing
on the track. This statement he repeated
four hours afterward in a letter to a
brother, who was an employee of the R.
R. Co. Defendant offered the oral statement and the letter in evidence. The
court excluded them.
Verdict for plaintiff for $2,500. Motion
for a new trial.
WILLER for the plaintiff.
The declarations were admissible in
evidence as part of the res gestae. Call v.
Easton Traction Co., 180 Pa. 618; Tompkins v. Saltmarsh, 14 S. & Rt. 272.
It is error to exclude an offer to show
that immediately after the occurrence,
the witness had made statements entirely
inconsistent with his testimony at the
trial. Com. v. Werntz, 161 Pa. 591. Cf.
Harriman v. Stone, 59 Mo. 93.
WILcox and JONES for the defendant.
The declarations were not a part of the
res gestae, but merely a passing remark
by a bystander, and not a spontaneous
utterance. McLeod v. Ginther, 80 Ky.
399; Lehay v. P. R. Co. 97 Mo. 165; Dustln
v. Radford, 58 Mich. 163; Ogden v. R. R.,
23 W. IT. 0. 191.
A declaration made two minutes after
the accident is not part of the resgestae.
Mindian R. Rt. Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U.
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S. 99; Cf. P. R. R. v. Brooks, 57 Pa. 339;
R. R. Co. v. Coyle 55 Pa. 402.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is a motion for a new trial by the
defendant company. It seems that when
Althorp was on the stand and testified for
the plaintiff that no bell had been rung
or whistle blown, and the train was coming at forty miles per hour, the defendant
did not ask the witness whether five minutes after the accident, he had remarked
to John Logan, and four hours after written to his brother, that Balph would not
have been struck had lie taken the trouble
to look and listen before venturing on the
tracks. This might have established contributory negligence on the part of plaiintiff, and he would not have been able to
recover. Had he been questioned whether
or not he made this remark, and had denied it, perhaps his oral statement and
letter would have been admissible to contradict his prior testimony. But it does
not appear that the defendant questioned
the witness in this manner. It only appears that the defendant offered the oral
statement and letter to establish the fact
of contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff. The court excluded the testimony, and hence the motion for a new
trial.
We think the court was right in excluding this evidence. The learned counsel
for the defendant claims that the oral
statement which he made five minutes
after the accidentshould have been admitted as a part of the re .qestae,and he cites
numerous authorities which will be noticed
hereafter in support of his contention.
We think those cases can be distinguished from the one now under consideration. We must first understand the
principle of the res gestae, and the reason
forits exception to the "hearsay rule."
Taylor says, "In all these cases the
principal points of attention are whether
the circumstances and declaration offered
in proof were so connected with the main
fact under consideration as to illustrate its
character, or to further its objects." Taylor on Ev. 588. The reason for its exception is: "That a person's mind is in a
state of excitement on account of some
event which happened to, or was seen by
him, or when a person's mind is occupied
with some transaction, and under such a
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state of mind he makes a statement, the
law presumes he told the truth, for he had
no time to think of an untruth. But how,
when and where shall he be connected
with the event or transaction, that his
declaration may be admissible? There
could no test be given for that. Their admissibility must be determined by the'
judge according to the degree of their relations to the facts.
The law is well settled by text writers
and by decisions, that before a statement
can be admitted as a partof the res gestae,
it must appear that the statement was
made contemporaneously with the main
fact, or at least, the two shall be so clearly
connected, that the declaration can, in an
ordinary course of affairs, be said to be the
spontaneous exclamation of the real cause.
Leather v. Gas Co., 97 Mo. 165; Waldele
v. N. Y. R. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 274; Luby v.
Hudson R. R. Co., 17 N. Y. 131 ; Rockell
v. Taylor, 41 Conn. 55.
It is true that the exception of the res
gestae to the hear say rule applies to bystanders as to those who are concerned
with the main fact. But a sound discretion should be exercised by the judge in
connecting the bystander to the transaction, that his statement may be said to
be made spontaneously. Suppose A and
B were in a train wreck, A was injured
and B not. 0 was merely an outside bystander. There would be no doubt that
the excitement and the influence of the
mind by the accident will last longer with
A than with B, and with B than with C,
and that B, who was the bystander in the
train, is more copnected with the main
fact than C, who was merely an outside
bystander, and that the state of mind will
change sooner by C than by B.
Now, let us consider the case at bar.
Althorp was merely an outside bystander;
he was neither connected with the train,
nor with the accident. He made his remarks five minutes after the accident had
happened. It does not even appear that
he made his remarks at the place where
Balph was struck down, and that the injured party was in his presence. The act
has been done and completed five minutes before his statement. We therefore
cannot hold his statement.as a part of the
res gestae, but purely as an opinion of a
past occurrence.
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In the case of the Vicksburg & Meridian
R. R. Co. v. O'Brien, (119 U. S. 99) the
question of admissibility of the evidence
of declaration by the engineer of a train,
which met with an accident, made from
ten or thirty minutes of the accident, resulted in a judgment against admitting
the evidence, although fiur of the judges
were in favor of admitting. But their
reason was, as TMr. Justice Field in his dissenting opinion says: "As the declaration was made between ten and thirty
minutes after the accident, we may well
conclude that it was made in the sight of
a wrecked train, and in presence of the injured parties, and whilst surrounded by
excited passengers. An accident happening to a raiwvay train by which a car is
wrecked, would naturally lead to a great
deal of excitement among the passengers
in the train, and the character and cause
of the accident would be the subject of explanation for a considerable time afterwards by passengers connected with the
train. We may add that the engineer
being under such a great responsibility
would surely be under still more excitement than the passengers. It is difficult
to perceive how anything given in Mr.
Justice Field's opinion can have any material bearing upon the case at bar. As we
have stated already, Althorp was not connected with the train. It does not even
appear that he made his statement in the
presence of the train and injured party.
He made his statement five minutes after
the accident and four hours later he repeated the same in a letter to his brother,
an employee of the R. R. Co., which letter
corroborated his prior statement, and who
can tell what his motive was in making
the statementand writing the letter? The
letter and statement are mere hearsay,
and they cannot be admitted. The case
of Hanover R. R. Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. 396,
and the case of Coll v. Easton Transit Co.,
180 Pa. 618, can be distinguished on the
same ground from the case atbar. We will
cite to support our view, Ogden v. R. R.
Co., 23 W. N. C. 191; Lane v. Bryant, 9
Gray 245 ; Beaver v. Taylor, 1 Wall. 637;
Insurance Co. v. Mosby, 8 Wall. 397.
In view of all those eases cited the
motion for a new trial is dismissed.
KAUFMAN, J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The learned court below excluded evidence that five minntes'after the accident,
Althorp had remarked to Logan that
Bnlpli wouhl not have been struck had he
taken the trouble to look and listen before
venturing on the track. Althorp was not
agent for Balph, nor in any way so connected with him as to justify the imputation of his remark to Balph. Had Balph
made it, it would have weighed heavily
against him. But Althorp would in no
way represent him in making the admission. As such, therefore, the remark was
inadmi-sible.
Was the remark a part of the res gestae?
The res was the collision of the train with
Balph. The act of Althorp was not a part
of the collision, neither cause, nor concomitant. The sensations of bystanders, their
seeing and hearing, the emotions which
stirred in them as the result of the accident, were not a part of it. Still less were
their exclamations, or their deliberate narratives, concerning it. Part of the resgestae
then, Althorp's remark could not be, nor
was.
But, was it a statement so near to the
occurrence, so sp0intaneous, as to be receivable, because of its probable correspondence with Althorp's perception of
the fact? It was not an exclamation. It
was bot synchronous with the collision.
Nothing shows that it was the result of
an excited impulse. It does not appear,
as the learned court below points out, that
the remark was made at the site of the accident. The interval of five minutes
would be unimportant, if the circumstances showed that the reflective and
critical attitude of mind had not been regained by the witness. But there are no
such circumstances.
The remark is not of a fact. It expresses
not an observation, but an opinion ; not
what did happen, but what would not
have happened had certain things not
happened. Althorp tells Logan that Bsilph
would not have been struck (but he was
struck) if he had taken the trouble to look
and listen. But, is this an assertion that
Balph did not look and listen ? Or is it
merely the expression of an inference that
Balph did not look and listen, from the
fact that he was struck? So far as appears, it may have been the latter. In-
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stead of a spontaneous utterance of a fact,
it may have been the expression of a
philosophizing mood.
The remark was not admissible as contradicting the present testimony of the
witness. There was no inconsistency between the statement that the bell had
not rung, nor the whistle blown, and that
the train was going at the rate of 40 miles
per hour, and the statement that Balph
did not stop, look and listen, or that had
he done so, he would not have been hurt.
That the statement was inserted in a
letter writte-i four hours later, to the witness' brother, qualified neither the oral
statement nor the letter, to be received in
evidence. An inadmissible statement does
not grow to be admissible by repetition.
Judgment affirmed.
WOODFILL BROS. vs. MARTHA
THOMPSON.
Mfarriedwomen-Rights-Separateproperty not liable for debts of husbandActs of April 11, 1848; April 22, 1850;
April 1, 1863.
STATEMEANT OF THE CASE.

Some time in the year 1890, Martha
Livingston, of the Borough of West
Brownsville, purchased a lot of ground in
the said borough worth about $1,200.00,
paying for it with her own funds. In 1894,
the said Martha Livingston married R. J.
Thompson; soon after their marriage R.
J. Thompson obtained a small grocery
store in West Brownsville, and ran it uunder the name of R. J. Thompson. The
said R. J. Thompson was killed on the
railroad some time in the year 1896. His
wife, Martha Thompson, continued running the grocery, having goods shipped to
her, and leaving the sign in front of her
store as R. J. Thompson. This busine-s
of Mrs. Thompson did not prove profitable, she becoming indebted to various
firms for various amounts. She confessed
judgment in the name of Martha Thompson to Woodfill Bros., on April 17th, 1899,
entered to No. 192 May Term, 1899, for
$266. On April 1, 1900, she obtained a
loan on the said property for $500, giving
a mortgage for that amount, which mortgage was duly recorded. The mortgagee
being Bernice Lily. The agent of Bernice
Lily made a thorough examination of the
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records and found no liens against the
property in the name of Martha Thompson, except the Woodfill Bros. judgment
above referred to. Woodfill Bros. issued
an execution on theirjudgment and levied
on and sold the lot of ground in West
Brownsville, purchased by Martha Livingston, now Martha Thompson. The day
of the sheriff's sale, Bernice Lily was informed that there were other judgments
that were liens upon the property of
Martha Thompson, other than the one
held by the Woodfill Bros., and that these
judgments, all of which were entered prior
to the date of the mortgage, were obtained
against R. J. Thompson, on November
28, 1898, and entered on JAnuary 4, 1899,
and that the holders of these judgments
would claim the right to the proceeds of
the sheriff's sale. These judgments aggregate the sum of $325. The property
was sold to Lewis S. Jackman for the sum
of $825, and there being a dispute as to the
application of this $82.5, Bernice Lily has
petitioned the court to appoint an auditor
to make distribution. The creditors of R.
J. Thompson claim to be first paid.
DAvis and RHODES, J., for the plaintiff.
A judgment against a deceased person
is nota nullity. Carry. Townsend'sEx.'s,
63 Pa. 203; Wooden v. Tainter, 4 Watts
270.
As admr. d. s. t., she is liable for all her
husband's debts to the value of the property at the time of so acting. Luffbarry's
Estate, 12Phila. 7; Wood's Estate, 1 Ash.
314.
HousE R and THORNE for the defendant.
A judgment obtained against the husband of a married woman before or during
marriage, shall not bind or be a lien upon
her real estate. Act of April 11, 1848 ; April
22, 1850 ; April 1,1863 ; Woodward v. Wilson, 68 Pa. 208.
Separate property of a married woman
is sold under a judgment obtained against
tier, the proceeds must be distributed
among her lien creditors in the order of
their priority. Findley's Appeal, 67 Pa.
453 ; Lewis v. Bunster, 57 Pa. 410.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
An investigation of the provisions of tihe
several acts of assembly governing the
property rights of married women leaves
little else to be said in the case at bar. By
S18, Act of April 11, 1848, it is provided,
inter alia, "* * * * the said property,
whether owned by herbefore marriage, or
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which shall accrue to her afterwards, shall
not be subject to levy and execution for
the debts or liabilities of her husband."
Cf. Act of April 22, 1850. Again, by the
Act of April 1, 1863, it is provided "No
judgment obtained against the husband of
any married woman, before or during marriage, shall bind, or be a lien upon her real
estate."
The property sold and from
which the fund in dispute was raised was
the individual property of Martha Thompson. It was her separate estate. Her husband never possessed rights in it save the
prospective right of curtesy. The debts
contracted by him were in his own name,
his wife at no time having made herself or
her property liable therefore. This is evident from the fact that in 1898, action for
the recovery of judgments, which claim
precedence here, were brought severally
against the estate of R. J. Thompson.
When Thompson died, his wife's estate
was unencumbered.
Whatever charges
are against her property are the results of
her own subsequent acts. No element of
fraud, or fraudulent holding out, on her
part, is disclosed. She continued the business. Goods were shipped to her and on
her responsibility. No one was injured
by her allowing the sign of R. J. Thompson to remain in front of the store. She
ordered goods in her name; they were
shipped in her name, on her responsibility. She became indebted to several parties, doubtless the persons from whom
she purchased goods. Among these creditors was the firm of Woodfill Bros., in
whose favor she confessed judgment for
$266, and this was placed on record. Other
breditors remained and to meet these obligations $600 was borrowed, and a mortgage given therefor. Execution issues on
the judgment, Martha Thompson's property is sold, and out of the $8'25 realized
the individual creditors of R. J. Thomr1pson claim to be first paid. That they have
no standing to assert such claim is evident
from the acts previously referred to. Moreover, it has been judicially passed upon in
a long line of cases. As wassaid by Agnew,
J., in Findley's Appeal, 67 Pa. 453, "In
order to maintain the right of a claim,
filed against the husband alone, to be paid
out of the fund, we must hold that .the
sale under such a claim would pass the
title of the wife which bhe holds in her

own right. But this is contrary to all our
notions of ajudicial sale. There is no relation of trustee and cestui que trust, or of
any other privity of estate, which can possibly make a sale in the name of one carry
the estate of the other. Not only is the
estate of the wife her own separate and
independent interest, but it is protected
by express statute from the acts, encumbrance and executions of the husband."
Beside this, both the judgment creditor
oflvlrs. Thompson as well as the mortgagee
have placed their dependence on the
record, and will be protected. Purchasers,
investors, etc., are not obliged to take notice of matters extraneous to the public
record, but which record only they are
bound to notice at their peril. "Such an
anomaly that the divestiture of her title
shall depend not on the record * * but
on extraneous proof * * "could not be
tolerated. What notice would the claim
against her husband be to subsequent lien
creditors or purchasers from her?
It
would not stand against her title on the
judgment index, or upon any record."
Findley's Appeal, 67 Pa. 453; Lloyd v.
Hibbs, 81 Pa. 306 ; Shannon v. Shultz, 87
Pa 481; Kuhns v. Turney, 87 Pa. 497;
Appeal of Germania Savings Bank, 95
Pa. 32d. "A judgment against him can
be levied only of his own estate 6r title.
* * * The purpose of the Act of 1850,
and still more of the Act of 1863, was to
prevent the wife from being deprived of
the benefit of her estate, through the derivative interest of her husband." Woodward v. Wilson, 68 Pa. 208; Milligan v.
Phipps, 153 Pa. 208. The learned auditor
has correctly held that since the levy was
made upon property recorded in her name
and the purchaser acquired her title, the
fund for distribution is the proceeds of the
sale of the wife's interest and should go in
payment of her lien creditors, according
to their priority.

ELMIES, J.

HAMLIN vs. CRARY.
Injunction-Building restriction-Condition in a deed-By whom it can be enforced.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Tromplin, owning two adjacent
lots, conveyed one of them (B) to Crary
by a deed which contained the words,
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"This conveyance is on the condition
that there shall never be erected on the
said lot a building nearer than twentyfive feet from the front of the building
line." On the lot (A), retained by Tromplin, was a house in which he resided and
from windows in the side of which he
had a view diagonally across the lot (B)
to the street. One of the purposes of the
condition was to perpetuate the enjoynient of the view. Five years after the
conveyance Tromplin died, and at Orphan's court sale for the payment of
debts, the lot (A) was sold to Hamlin,
one of the three nephews, who were the
next of kin and heirs. The price paid
was $2,700, all of which was consumed in
paying the debts. Two years after the sale
Crary began to erect a building on the
building line of his lot. This was a bill
for an injunction.
MAYS and KNAPPENBERGER for plain-

tiff.
The restriction was imposed for the
benefit of the property now held by coamplainant. Clark v. ,Martin, 49 Pa. 297.
The building restriction was in the nature of a covenant running with the land
and created an easement in favor of the
adjoining lot. Muzzarelli v. Hulshizer.
163 Pa. 643.
This was not merely a personal right in
the original owner, but was an easement
appurtenant to the estate which plaintiff
purchased. Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass.
546. Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass. 591.
HICKERNELL and PEIGHTEL for defendant.
The controlling element in such cases is
the intention ofthe parties to the covenant.
Hutchinson v. Thomas, 190 Pa. 242; Landell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. 327.
This is not a condition which the heirs
of the grantor can enforce, but merely a
personal covenant with the grantor. Skinner v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180; Clapp v.
Wilder, 50 L. R. A. 121.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

We think this case turns upon the legal
effect of the phrase contained in the deed
from Tromplin to Crary. "This conveyance is on the condition that there.shall
never be erected on said lot a building
nearer than 25 ft. from the front building
line on the lot." Whether this is a comimon law condition or a covenant running
with the land, it is unnecessary for us to
determine in this kind of an action, because the action is in a court of equity. It
would be otherwise if the action was
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brought in a common law court. The case
.of Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 297, holds" If it
were a proceeding in the common law
form, it would be necessary to inquire into the form in which the right is reserved,
but in equity form of proceeding we inquire only into its substantial elements.,
The first question which confronts usis
whether this restriction was imposed for
the benefit of the laud now held by the
plaintiff, or whether it was imposed for
the mere personal benefit of the grailtor.
This question can only be solved by ascertaining the intention of the parties,
when the land was conveyed, in the light
of surrounding circumstances, or as Mr.
Justice Dean puts it in Landell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. 327: "In equity the test by
which to determine whether a covenant
in a deed runs with the land, is the intention of the parties; to ascertain such intention, resort must be had to the words
of the covenant in the light of the surroundings of the parties and the subject
of the grant."
There is no language in the deed from
Tromplin to Crary, expressly stating that
this restriction was inserted to create a
servitude or right which should inure to
the benefit of the plaintift's land. And
we think this is rendered all the more
certain and significant when we take into
consideration the fact that the grantee's
heirs and assigns are not included in the
restrictive clause, which words, we think
it is extremely probable, he would have inserted if he had intended it to benefit his
land "forever" and not merely himself
for life.
This is not the case where the owner of
land adopts a scheme or plan for its improvement, as is illustrated by the cases of
Muzzarelli v. Hulshizer, 163 Pa. 643, Landell v. Hamilton, 175Pa. 327 and 17Stper.
C. 2.35. Because in those cases there is an
express language to the effect in the deeds,
showing an intention to create a benefit
appurtenant to the land.
The only circumstance which may be
relied upon as showing that the grantor
intended to create a benefit remaining
with the land, is the fact that he was occupying it as a homestead at the time of
the grant, and that it would be a benefit to
the land to have the restriction observed
after his death. But the facts of the case
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are just as consistent with the idea that
the grantor intended that the land should
have the benefit of the restriction as long
as the grantor lived. For after his death,
he having received all the benefit he could
receive from the restriction, it would be
immaterial to him whether the restriction
was observed or not observed. This doctrine is sustained by the cases of Skinner
v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180, and Clapp v.
Wilder, 50 L. R. A. 121, a recent Massachusetts case, decided in June, 1900. We
are prone to admit that .the doctrine of
Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289, is seemingly
in conflict when comparing the cases superficially, but upon full examination we
think that the confliction Is more apparent than real.
There is no merit in the argument that
the plaintiff received his title through aii
Orphan's Court sale, for the purchaser
takes only such title as the decedent had
Bashore v. Whistler, 3
at his death.
Watts 494. Kennedy's Appeal, 4 Pa. 149.
We think the plaintiff's case falls flatly
when considered in the true light of attendant circumstances. Bill dismissed.
GRoss, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The clause quoted from Tromplin's deed
to Crary, expresses a condition. But, it
is not as a condition that Hamlin is seeking to enforce it. As a condition it can be
enforced only by an entry or by ejectment.
This bill is neither. Nor could any other
than Tromplin or his heir avail himself of
it. Hamlin is not Tromplin's heir.
But, the same act oromission, by which
the grant is conditioned, may also be
agreed or covenanted for, and, when such
agreement or covenant is descried in the
words, the remedies proper to it may be
employed. Electric City Land etc. Co.
v. Coal Co., 187 Pa. 500. When the intention is discovered, to impose a restriction on the use of one tract, for the
advantage of another, despite mutations
of ownership, a servitude will be held to be
created, and a court of equity will compel
the owner of the servient land to respect
it. Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289; St. Andrews Churchs' Appeal, 67 Pa. 512; Landell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. 327; Muzzarelli
v. Hulshizer, 163 Pa. 643.
We do not understand that this principle

was seriously contested in the court below.
What was contested was the intention of
Tromplin to impose on the owner of the
Crary lot a restriction for a longer period.
than that of the continued ownership by
Tromplin, of the adjacent lot. Tromplin
continued to own this lot for five.years,
but, then dying, his estate in it was sold,
under the order of the Orphan's Court, to
Hantlin, one of his heirs, and Hamlin now
alleges that the restriction was intended
not for the benefit of Tromplin, so long
as he continued to own the lot, but for the
benefit of the lot, in whosesoever ownership.
The language of the deed is "that there
shall never be erected" etc., and it rather
clearly points out that the erection forbidden was forbidden not for a term of
years, or for the life of the grantor, but in
perpetuity.
To qualify this signification, reference is
made to the fact that Tromplin resided in
the house on the lot retained by him, that
in the side of this house were windows
looking across the lot sold from which a
view of the street could be had, and that
one of his purposes was to "perpetuate
the enjoyment of this view." From these
facts the learned court below has concluded that the restriction was intended
to last only during Tromplin's ownership,
and has therefore dismissed the bill.
It is indeed difficult to imagine any
other object of the restriction than to
preserve the access of view, light and air
to Tromplin's house, through the lateral
windows, and should he or his successors
in the ownership ever close up those windows, permanently, it is very likely that
the courts finding no purpose useful to
the dominant premises, any longer subserved, would hold that the restriction had
become extinct. f Landell v. Hamilton,
175 Pa. 327, 337. What we are concerned
to learn is, some intimation that the object was to preserve the view, for only a
brief period of time. We fail to find any.
The circumstance that Tromplin was personally occupying the dominant house is
not such. If he appreciated the light, air
and view, he must have known that his
successors in the occupancy, would do the
same. By perpetuating the right to such
view, he would maintain a greater market value for the house. "To perpetuate
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the enjoyment of this view" is not equivalent to perpetuating "hisenjoymentof this
view." Besides, "one of the purposes" of
the condition was this. There were therefore others, and among them, may have
been the enhancement of the selling value
of the dominant premises, by securing for
all purchasers, a right to an unobstructed
view. The "condition" is thatthere shall
"never" be erected a building within a
given space, and we are not able to discover, in the facts found, adequate reason
for changing the word "never," to "never
during Tromplin's ownership." Had
Crary understood the word "never" in
this sense, how natural it would have
been for him to have insisted that the
words needful to remove doubt be inserted.
We have examined Clapp v. Wilder,
176 Mass. 332, which is in most respects
similar to the case before us. Though
the majority of the court dismissed the
bill, three respectable members dissented,
and we are convinced that the dissenters
had the better reason. In the case before
us, the facts adverted to by Hammond, J.
on page 339, do not appear.
The conclusion we have reached is that
a fair interpretation of the language of
the deed and of the facts, is that a perpetual right to light, air and view, was reserved by the condition to the dominant
lot, and that this right should be protected
from violation by injunction. Clark v.
Martin, 49 Pa. 297.
Decree reversed.

I

3.

its beginning, communicated his fear that
it was not extinct, to Boylston, and wished
that more thorough means be employed
to put it out. He did not do this because
he was not on speaking terms with
Boylston. The damage suffered was $560.
SCHNEE and ALBERTSON for plaintiff.

It is for the jury to decide whether defendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's damage. Haverly v. R.
R. Co., 135 Pa. 50; Born v. Allegheny
Plank Road Co., 101 Pa. 336.
If the plaintiff has made out his case
without showing contributory negligence
on his part it is incumbent on defendant
to prove it. Contributory negligence is not
presumed. King v. Thompson, 87 Pa. 365;
Bom v. Plank Road Co., Supra.; R. R.
v. Hassard, 75 Pa. 367.
Whether theconductofplaintiffamounted to contributory negligence is a question
for the jury. 87 Pa. 365;76 Pa. 168; 66 Pa.
30; 101 Pa. 336.
SHERBINE and CHAPMAN for defendant.
The facts being undisputed and the inference to be drawn from them being free
from doubt, it is a question for the court,
81 Pa. 274; 119 Pa. 53; 160 Pa. 365; 172 Pa.
646; 104 Pa. 306.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action for damages caused by
the destruction of the building of the
plaintiff, John Cook, in the following
manner: Defendant and plaintiff respectively owned adjoining tracts of land. The
defendant was making a lawful use of fire
on his premises when by some negligence
on his part the fire caught a pile of lumber
near by. It was, however, gotten under
control and finally, as the defendant supCOOK vs. BOYLSTON.
posed, extinguished. The fire, however,
only slumbered, and in the course of three
Negligence- Proximate cause-Contribu- hours was revived by a vigorous breeze,
tory negligence-Prorinceof the court
burned the lumber and finally the buildandjury.
ing of the plaintiff. It seems that the
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
damage could have been prevented had
the plaintiff, who feared the fire had
Cook and Boylston owned adjoining
tracts. On his, Boylston carried on a busi- not been extinguished, made known his
fears to the defendant and insisted that
ness which required the use of fire. By
some negligence of his servants, the fire more thorough means be used to put it
out: this he did not do. On these facts a
caught a pile of lumber, which after sone
motion has been made to enter a nonsuit.
howfire,
The
suppressed.
was
difficulty
ever, only smouldered, and after three After a careful examination of the Pennhours was renewed by a vigorous breeze, sylvania authorities we are unwilling to
started up into fury, involving the whole take the questions here presented away
pile of lumber, and at length set fire to the from the jury.
Two questions arise, first: Was the
buildings on Cook's tract. The fire could
of the defendant the proximate
negligence
saw
who
have been prevented had Cook,
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not been extinguished, is to be determined
or remote cause of the burning of the
plaintiff's building? If the remote cause
by the jury.
there can be no recovery. Second: Was
Motion to enter a nonsuit is overruled.
the plaintiff guilty of contributory negliRHODES, J.
gence? If so, he cannot recover. LeRoy
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
Haverly v. State Line R. R. Co. 135 Pa.
50. The proximate cause is the immediate
Boylston was within his right, in concause. If a new force or power has inter- ducting a business on his premises tbatrevened of itself sufficient to stand as the
quired the use of fire. But the existence
cause of the misfortune the other must be
of the fire put on him a. duty carefully to
considered as too remote. Who is to deguard it so that it might not communicate
cide whether an act is the proximate or
to the buildings of Cook. It might thus
the remote cause? LeRoy Haverly v.
communicate, by seizing inflammable maState Line R. R. Co. states the rule as it
terial in large quantity, such as a lumber
is applied, in our opinion, in Pennsylvania.
pile, on his own premises, and thence
and also the case of the Penna. R. R. Co.
leaping to the structures upon the adjav. Hoag, 80 Pa. 873. In the latter case
cent land. There might then, as regards
the Chief Justice says: The jury must deCook, be negligence in allowing the lumtermine whether the facts constitute a
ber pile to catch fire. If combustible stuff
continuous succession of events so linked
was scattered at such intervals between
together that they become a natural whole
the original locality of the fire, and Cook's
or whether the chain of events is so broken
buildings, as to make the spread of it to the
that they become independent, and the
buildings probable, in case of failure to
final result cannot be said to be the nat- watch and repress, negligence in watchural and probable consequence of the pri- ing would visit on Boylston the consemary cause, the negligence of the defendquences.
ant.
Boylston's agents negligently allowed
As to the second question raised: Conthe fire to catch the lumber pile. Their
tributory negligence is a want of ordinary
want of care is, it is needless to say, imcare upon the part of a person injured by
putable to him. Cooley, Torts, 700. It
the actionable negligence of another, comnow became their and his duty to extinbining and concurring with that negliguish the combustion of the lumber. They
gence and contributing to the injury as a
made an attempt to do so. They "supproximate cause thereof, without which
pressed" the fire, but did not put it out. Tt
the injury would not have occurred. Who
smouldered, and after three hours, was reis to say whether there has been a want of
kindled by a breeze. Had the fire in the
ordinary care? The question is generally
lumber been put out, of course a fresh act
for the jury. It is only when there is no
of negligent creation of an unintended fire
reasonable doubt as to the facts, or as to
would have been necessary, to visit rethe just inferences to be drawn therefrom,
sponsibility on Boylston. The nexus bethat the question may properly be passed
tween the initial negligence and the burnupon by the court. McKee v. Bidwell, 74
ing of Cook's buildings would have been
Pa. 218. Baker V. Felio, 97 Pa. 70. In
broken. But, there was no such breach.
135 Pa. 50, heretofore cited, it was said:
The revived fire was a continuation of the
When a person knows of the existence of
first fire in the lumber, and that was the
a fire upon the property of another, which
result of the negligent supervision of the
is likely to spread and destroy his own
fire employed in Boylston's business.
property, he is bound to use reasonable
It is true that Boylston's servants supcare and diligence to prevent its spreading,
pressed the fire. They may have thought
whether he has done so when, after atthat they had put it out. But they had
not. Even had there been no negligence
tempting to extinguish it he has gone away,
in allowing the fire to reach the lumber,
mistakenly supposing that it was out, is a
question to be determined by the jury. So
there may have been negligence in not
wholly extinguishingitin the lumber, and
in this case, whether the plaintiff acted as
whether there was, would be a question
an ordinarily prudent man would act wio
for the jury. The fire was in fact not put
knew cf the fire, and feared that it had
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out. The revived fire was a later phase of did Cook know, or should he have known,
that his speaking to Boylston would have
the same continuous act of combustion.
But, it is objected, the rise of a breeze was prevented the fire? If his speaking would
the occasion of the revival and exacerba- not have induced Boylston to increase his
tion of the fire. So it was. But a man is diligence, the failure to speak was not a
cause of the omission thus to increase his
notexcused fromliability for consequences,
because they were produced, not by his diligence. And, even if it would, in order
to convict Cook of negligence, it must apown act alone, but by the co-operation
therewith, of other forces. No conse- pear that to him there appeared a reasonquences are produced by human acts able probability that his speaking to Boylalone. Causation is not simple but multi- ston would be followed by action. The
ple. Every event issues from a mass of court could not have assumed that the
causes and conditions. The fact that the omishion of Cook to speak was a cause of
the subsequent conflagration.
wind arose three hours after the cessation
Judgment affirmed.
of the effort to put out the fire, does not
make the wind the cause of the revived
fire; and cut the casual tie between the
AMES vs. COLLINS.
smouldering combustion and that new
fire. Without the wind, no new fire, but, Bights of Riparianowners-stoppel.
also, without the obscure combustion, no
new fire.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The real question is, not whether there
Collins owned a track of land on which
is a casual connection between the initial was a spring of water. The water came
or any intermediate negligence and the from higher sources in the west. To the
injury to Cook's buildings, but whether east of Collins' tract was that of Ames.
the intervening of the wind, as a co-oper- There was a descent of Collins' land from
ating cause, was fairly expectable, and, if a line west of the spring to Ames and the
so, whether the effect of re-kindling the water from the spring flowed in a narrow
fire was also fairly expectable. We think,
channel to and over Ames' land. Collins
in the absence of evidence of an extraordi- used the water for cooking, drinking and
nary character of the breeze, that it was washing, but he sold to a neighbor the
not error to allow the jury to say whether right to conduct away a portion of it in a
it was so little unlikely, that Boylston pipe.
should have had reference to it, and made
Ames had been using the water to irriprovision against its effect, in case it
gate a meadow of twelve acres, having cut
should come. Cf. Haverly v. R. R. Co.,
little channels for it over the meadow.
135 Pa. 50; Yoders v. Amwell Township,
Had Collins used it in a similar manner
172 Pa. 447.
no water would have reached Ames' tract.
Cook, having witnessed the fire in the Had Ames not used it as he did, nor Collins as he did, the stream would have
lumber, feared that the efforts to put it out
had not succeeded, but refrained from ad- reached the farm lying to the east of Ames.
monishing Boylston to employmore thor- It had never reached there owing to the
ough means, because he was not on speak- uses to which Ames and Collins had put in.
In a previous action by Mrs. Ames, wife
ing terms with Boylston. The knowledge
of William, she had claimed as owner, and
of the fire in the lumber pile imposed on
Cook a duty of vigilantprecaution against William had testified that she was the
its spreading. Haverly v. R. R. Co., 135 owner. He now shows that her father
Pa. 50, and if he omitted this duty, and had executed a deed for the land to him,
the omission contributed to the injury and deposited it with a mutual friend
subsequently suffered by him, he could until the grabtor's death, and that this
not recover. We think the learned court friend had not delivered the deed to him
properly left to the jury, the decision or informed him of it at the time of the
whether Cook had been guilty of contribu- trial of the former action, and that he had
tory negligence. The fire could have been supposed his wife was the owner as heir of
prevented had Cook spoken his fear to her father.
Trespass for damages.
Boylston. But, wouldit have been? And
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BENJAmIN and KAUFBIAN for the plaintiff.
The upper riparian owner is liable tothe
owner of the land below him for every material diminution of the flow of the water
by a diversion of the stream whether for
Question
irrigation or other purposes.
does not turn on whether occupant below
has sufflcient water left for his domestic
purposes, but whether the quantity flowing on his land has been materially lesselied or diminished. 9 Pa. 74; 25 Pa. 528;
24 Pa. 298.
The sizeof the stream is immaterial if it
has a well defined channel and a regular
flow in that channel, it cannot be diverted
to the injury of the riparian proprietor below. 12 Wend, 330.
Evidence tending to show injury to parties east of Ames is inadmissible, as it
does not prove a fact having legal operation on the rights of parties to this suit.
10 Watts 128.
Ames is not estopped from bringing this
suit by his testimony in the previous
action by Mrs. Ames. When a pirty has
acted in ignorance of his title, to his prejudice, he will be relieved in equity. Whefan's Appeal, 70 Pa. 410.
MILLER and FLEITZ for the defendant.
There being nothing to show the spring
is fed by a defined stream, it must be presumed to be formed by perculating water
and as such it belongs wholly to the owner
of the soil. Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 803.
Collins had a right to sell the water as
the spring was upon his own land, and the
damage to Ames is damnum absque injuria. Penn. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113
Pa. 1.36.
Ames is estopped from setting up his
title, by his testimony at the former trial.
Lord v. Water Co., 135 Pa. 122.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This deed conveyed title to Ames and
he has the right to bring this action.
Where a deed, duly executed, is delivered
by a grantor to a third person to be kept
by him until after the death of the grantor
and then to be delivered to the grantee,
such delivery after the grantor's death,
passes title to the grantee. Where the
future delivery of a deed is merely to
await the lapse of time or the happening
of some contingency and not the performance of any condition it will he
deemed the grantor's dedd presently.
Stephens v. Reenhart, 72 Pa. 434.
Neither is he estopped from bringing
this action on account of his testimony in
the former action, for in estoppel the
element of fraud is essential. Hill v. Epley,
31 Pa. 331.

Another of the weightiest elements of
estoppel, knowledge of his own rights in
the subject matter, is absent, and there is
no other ground on which defendant could
base any equity againstplaintiff. Hays v.
Hays, 179 Pa. 277.
There can be no such thing as ownership in flowing water; the riparian owner
may use it as it flows, he may dil it up
and become the owner by emptying it in
barrels or tanks, but so long as it flows it
is as free to all as the light and air. Haup's
Appeal, 125 Pa. 211. To entitle a stream
to the consideration of tile law, it is
certainly necessary that it be a wyater
course, in the proper sense of the term.
A spring gutter on the surface is novertheless a water course although it is not
equal in volume to a river. Small as it
may be, if it has a clear and well defined
channel, it cannot be diverted to the
injury of the proprietor's below. Wheatley
v. Bough. 25 Pa. 528.
The flowing of this stream for a long
time through the land of the plaintiff
gives him as owner of the property the
right to a continuods use of the stream for
the customary purposes of agriculture and
if the upper riparian owner or any person
claiming under him divert the stream
from its natural channel, leading it off
from the land and appropriating it for
other purposes than those of agriculture
for which it has been theretofore used, the
person so diverting it, subjects himself to
an action for damages such as the person injured may have sustained. Lord
v. Meadville Water Co, 135 Pa. 122.
A proprietor of land over which a stream
of water runs, has as, against a lower proprietor, the use of only so much of the
stream as will not materially diminish
its quality. His right is not to be measured by the reasonable dividends of his
business. Wheatly v. Crismer, 24 Pa. 298.
A man may use the water of a stream
for the purpose of watering his meadows,
provided that he so constructs his races or
the ground is so situated that any surplus will return again into the natural
channel before it reaches the occupant
below him, and provided that the flow of
water which the occupant below was previously entitled to the use of is not materially diminished. Where he goes beyond
this, even for watering his meadows, he
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The general principle adopted by civilized countries and states is that the
nature, validity and interpretation of a
contract are governed by the law of the
state or country where the contract is
made or is to be executed; but the remedies
are governed by the laws of the state or
country where enforcement of the contract
is sought i. e. by the lexfori. In other
words the obligations of the parties to a
contract are expounded by the lex loci contractus, but actions brought to enforce
them either in the state where made or in
other states are subject to the means
pointed out by the law of the state in
MOSER vs. KERPER.
which the action is instituted. The cases
Inter retation, lex loci contractus-?em- of Andrews et al v. Herriot, 4 Cowen, 508,
edy, lex fori- When procedure is made and Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johnson (N. Y.)
part of contract-Statute of limitations 238, serve to illustrate the principle. In
-Acts of March 27, 1713 and June 26,
the former it was held that an action of
1895.
covenant would not lie in New York on a
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
contract to be performed in Pennsylvania,
Jacob Kerper, on August 11th, 1890, where a scroll and the word seal were
made a note for $470.00 in Iowa, payable
used instead of a seal, although the law of
to plaintiff three months after date with Pennsylvania recognizes such scroll as a
interest at eight per cent. The statute of seal.
limitations of Iowa allowed four years on
In Warren v. Lynch, an instrument
which to sue on a contract. It avoided non- was executed in Virginia with a scroll,
negotiable notes unless the consideration
but payable in New York, and which was
was expressed, or the words "value re- regarded by the laws of Virginia as a
ceived" were written in them. In the sealed instrument, was held in New York
note there was no mention of considera- to be unsealed, because the laws of the lattion. The court told the jury the action
ter state recognized no instrument as sealed
having begun five years and eleven
unless sealed with wax or wafer. Had
months after the note became payable, the instrument been made payable in Virthat action was barred; that if it was not, ginia it would doubtless have been reonly six per cent. interest could be col- garded as sealed by the courts of New
lected on it and the note was valid, Mo- York. A few of a long list of additional
tion for a new trial.
cases supporting the same view, are 17
WILLIAMSON and GRoss for plaintiffi
Mass. 55; 1 Pa. 381; 58 Pa. 24, and 8
The statute of limitations as it affects Peters (U. S.) 360. This principld is carthe remedy is to be applied according to the
lexfori. Watson v. Brewster, 1 Pa. 381 ; ried so far that the contract if good in the
Building and Loan Association v. Stock- state of its inception, is good in another,
ton, 148 Pa. 146.
even though it would be void had it been
Act of June 26, 1895, does not apply to entered in the latter, (1 Grant 51), excauses of action which have accrued prior
to its passage. Shinn v. Healy, 23 C. C. cept where domestic policy forbids: 78
Ill. 558; 10 Mich. 283; 13 Pet. (U S.) 519.
123; Metz v. Hipps, 96 Pa. 15.
Wright for defendant.
It would be a natural sequence that the
settled interpretation put by the court on
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This motion for a new trial involves a the statutes of its own state is followed by
consideration of two general points: first, the courts in other states. Case v. Cushman, 3 W. & S. 544.
the law by which the validity of contracts
Courts must always determine what apis tested and the law by which they are
enforced; second, can this contract be en- propriately belongs to the contract and
forced in Pennsylvania although unen- what to the remedy, because they recognize to a certain extent the mode of
forcible in Iowa?
must release the right to do so from the
occupants of the stream below or he subjects himself to a suit for damages. Miller v. Miller, 9 Pa. 74.
Collins conveyed the water away in a
pipe and as the stream wa.s a small spring
run it must have materially diminished
the flow. The water was not used for agricultural purposes and he is therefore liable
in damages.
Judgment for plaintiff for damages sustained.
THORNE, J.
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enforcement as a part of Lhe contract
and of the lex loci, when the contract is
presumed to have been made with reference to such mode. This is the case, especially, where statutes prescribe a particular mode of procedure, and is applied
by the Pennsylvania courts on the ground
that all other modes are excluded by the
contract. Thus in the Sea Grove Building and Loan Association v. Stockton,
148 Pa. 146, where under the law of.N. J.
(Act of March 23, 1881) in order to collect
a debt secured by a bond and mortgage, a
creditor must first foreclose the mortgage
and sell the mortgaged property, and then
if there be any deficiency, he may sue upon the bond, provided he begins suit within six months from the date of the said
sale, the court held such a mode of procedure an incident to the contract and
that it must be applied in an action
brought in a Pennsylvania court. In such
a case the law affected not only the remedy but also the rights of the parties to the
contract. So, too, the right of a surety to
discharge his obligation by a verbal notice
to the creditor to pursue the principal
debtor, when the law of the state where
he became surety requires written notices,
is a matter affecting the obligation of the
contract and is determined by the lex loci
contractus, notwithstanding verbal notice
is a method used in Pennsylvania. Tenant
v. Tenant, 110 Pa. 478.
Since the time within which to bring an
action on a contract is not mutually contemplated by the parties to it otherwise
than as stipulated therein, it follows that
the statutes of limitation form no part of
the contract itself; hence they affect not
the right but the remedy only. This is
evidenced by the fact that states may
limit the time within which to bring an
action without impairing the obligation of
contracts, if they allow a "reasonable
time" to bring suit on a cause already in
existence. 20 Howard (U. S.) 22.
All the authorities and decisions too are
in harmony on this point. So that an
action brought in Pennsylvania to vindicate a foreign right is governed not by tie
foreign statute, but by the Pennsylvaiia
statute. 2 Kent Cor. 462, 463; 3 Clark,
377; 1 Pa. 381; 6 Pa. C. C. 39. Hence an
action not barred by the laws of the
foreign state is barred in Pennsylvania
provided our statute of limitation has already run against it, 6 Wall (U. S.) 538,
but such a bar is not necessarily an extinguishment of the the contract in other
states, especially the state where the contract was nmade. U. S. Bank v. Donnally,
8 Peters (U. S.) 360. Similarly, if the
statute of the state in which the contract
was made has fully run, the aggrieved
party may effectually bring his action in

another state by whose laws the action is
not barred, due regard, of course, being
had for the service of legal process upon
the defendant. 17 Mass. 55; 19 Iowa 531; 3
Johnson, 263; 3 Clark, 377; 1 Pa. 381. It is
sufficient, therefore, if the remedy in Pennsylvania is sought within the time prescribed by the Pennsylvania laws and not
by the Iowa laws.
This brings us to apply the law to the
case in hand. The act of March 27, .1713,
limits the time within which to bring an
action on a contract to six years. Action
having been begun five years eleven
months after the note became payable, it
is clear that it is brought within the statutory time, regardless of the Iowa statute.
If the note was valid at its inception in
Iowa, it is still valid here, and this is the
conclusion drawn from the statement of
facts. The Iowa law avoids non-negotiable notes unless the consideration is expressed or the words "value received"
are written therein. The facts expressly
reveal that no mention ot consideration
is made, but are silent as to the words
" value received," thus leading to the
single conclusion that the note contains
such a phrase; and since either the expression of the consideration or the words
" value received" satisfy the Iowa law,
the note is valid. The inference is likewise drawn that the note is payable in
Iowa inasmuch as no place of payment is
mentioned; 6 Wharton 331; 135 Pa. 173.
But it is suggested that the Act of June
26th, 1895, barring a cause of action already fully barred by the lawsof the state
in which said action arose, is a complete
defence to this cause. Suffice it to say
that this act would be unconstitutional
and void if it were applied to this as well
as to other causes existing at the date of
its passage, and it has been so decided in
Shinn v. Healy, 23 Pa. C. C. 123. Statutes
which do not allow a reasonable time
within which to bring existing causes of
action are in violation of the clause in
Article 1, Section 10, of the U. S. Constitution, providing that no other state shall
pass any "ex-post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts." Cooly
on Constitutional law, section 365, 366;
64 Pa. 5.5 ; 96 Pa. 15 ; 95 U.S. 628 ; Trickett
on Limitation, page 211, section 166.
From the foregoing, it is evident that
the amount of interest collectible on the
note will depend upon the rate of interest
agreed upon in the note, if that be not
above the rate allowed by the Iowa law;
but this will be properlyconsidered in the
new trial. It is enough to award a new
trial, that the court erred in telling the
jury that the action is barred. Motion
for a new trial made absolute.
HOUSER, J.

